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Article

Too Big To Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts,
and Corporate Responsibility
Steven L. Schwarcz †
INTRODUCTION
There is an increasing worldwide regulatory focus on trying
to end the problem of too big to fail (TBTF) 1: that systemically
important financial firms 2 might engage in excessive risk-taking
because they would profit from success and be bailed out by the
government to avoid a failure. This is primarily a problem of
moral hazard;3 persons protected from the negative consequences of their risky actions will be tempted to take more
risks. 4 Excessive risk-taking was widely seen as one of the pri-
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schwarcz@law.duke.edu. I thank Emilios Avgouleas, Daniel Awrey, John Buley,
Lee Reiners, and participants in a Finance & Law Series faculty workshop at
Duke University and at the Hazelhoff Guest Lecture, Leiden University, for
valuable comments. I also thank Aleaha Jones for invaluable research assistance. Copyright © 2017 by Steven L. Schwarcz.
1. See, e.g., Too Big To Fail, Too Big To Exist Act, S. 1206, 114 Cong.
(2015); INDEP. CMTY. BANKERS OF AM., ENDING TOO BIG TO FAIL (Jun. 25,
2013), https://www.icba.org/docs/default-source/icba/news-documents/press
-release/2013/endtbtfstudy.pdf.
2. The acronym TBTF is sometimes used as an adjective by referring to
systemically important financial firms as TBTF firms. For clarity, this Article
hereinafter refers to these firms as simply systemically important firms.
3. Although TBTF has also been described as a problem of taxpayerfunded government bailouts, that description is partly circular. A systemically
important firm would only need a bailout to avoid failure, and failure would
most likely result from excessive risk-taking. If that risk-taking could be controlled, the need for government bailouts would be greatly reduced. Part IV.A
of this Article examines how to control that risk-taking. Part IV.B of the Article
examines how to minimize the public cost of bailing out systemically important
firms that would fail notwithstanding that risk-taking control. See infra notes
172–91 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE
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mary causes of the 2007–2008 financial crisis (the “financial crisis”),5 and it is regarded as a continuing threat that can misallocate resources, increase public costs by necessitating government bailouts,6 and even cause another economic collapse. 7
For these reasons, much of the financial regulation responding to the financial crisis, including the Dodd-Frank Act 8—
whose very preface states it is “[a]n Act . . . to end ‘too big to
fail’”—has been inspired at least in part by the goal of ending
TBTF. 9 The principal domestic effort to achieve that goal is currently being undertaken by the Minneapolis Federal Reserve
Bank (the “Minneapolis Fed”) under the leadership of its current

HAZARDS OF BANK BAILOUTS (2004); Neel Kashkari, President and CEO, Fed.
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Lessons from the Crisis: Ending Too Big To Fail,
Remarks at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 16, 2016), https://
www.minneapolisfed.org/~/media/files/news_events/pres/kashkari-ending-tbtf
-02-16-2016.pdf (referring to “the risks and challenges posed by large banks and
moral hazard”).
5. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES xviii–xix (2011) (identifying excessive risk-taking by systemically important firms as a primary cause
of the financial crisis); Jacob J. Lew, Opinion, Let’s Leave Wall Street’s Risky
Practices in the Past, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/opinions/jacob-lew-lets-leave-wall-streets-risky-practices-in-the-past/
2015/01/09/cf25b5f6-95d8-11e4-aabd-d0b93ff613d5_story.html (repeatedly attributing the financial crisis to “excessive risks taken by financial” firms); The
Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), http://
www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are
-still-being-felt-five-years-article (identifying excessive risk-taking as one of
three causes of the financial crisis, the other causes being irresponsible lending
and regulators being “asleep at the wheel”).
6. For discussion of the ongoing concern of regulators over public costs associated with bailouts of systemically important firms, see Gustavo Gari, Using
Bazookas and Firewalls To Regulate Systemic Risk in the Financial Market: The
Problems with Bailouts and Bank Breakups and the Case for Network Interconnectivity, 12 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 155, 165 (2013) (noting that Congress enacted
the Dodd-Frank Act to try to avoid the need for taxpayer-funded bailouts of systemically important firms); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A
Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV.
951, 1021 (2011).
7. STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 23–28.
8. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5641 (2012).
9. Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent
Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. 795, 797–98 (2011) (arguing that the Dodd-Frank Act is directed at freeing the public from again having to choose between the unpalatable externalities of bearing the cost of a massive infusion of capital into a firm whose risktaking has left it facing collapse, and a possible systemic collapse).
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President, former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Financial Stability Neel Kashkari. 10 Kashkari claims “there is no question that [the] presence [of systemically important banks] at the
center of our financial system contributed significantly to the
magnitude of the [financial] crisis and to the extensive damage
it inflicted across the economy.” 11 He also sees “widespread
agreement among elected leaders, regulators and Main Street
that we must solve the problem of TBTF.” 12
The principal international effort to end TBTF is being led
by the Financial Stability Board, 13 an organization established
by the G20 nations to monitor and make recommendations about
the global financial system. To that end, the Financial Stability
Board has published “two final guidance papers to assist the resolution planning work of authorities and firms, as part of the
policy agenda to end ‘too-big-to-fail.’” 14 These papers discuss,
among other things, the progress in the “development of policies
to address the risks posed by too-big-to-fail banks” in order to
“contribute to greater resolvability of systemically important
firms and resilience of the financial system.” 15
This Article argues that, contrary to currently accepted regulatory wisdom, the problem of TBTF is exaggerated. The central evil of TBTF is based on an assumption: that the expectation
of a bailout will cause systemically important firms to engage in
10. Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Seeking Comment on Ending Too
Big To Fail, https://minneapolisfed.org/publications/special-studies/endingtbtf/
share-your-ideas (online form allowing individuals to submit “ideas, input and
research” to help guide the initiative). Kashkari hoped to announce a formalized
plan to end TBTF by the end of 2016. Kashkari, supra note 4, at 2.
11. Kashkari, supra note 4, at 2.
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., John Glover & Ilya Arkhipov, End of ‘Too-Big-To-Fail’ Banking Era Endorsed by World Leaders, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 2015), http://www
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-15/end-of-too-big-to-fail-banking-era
-endorsed-by-world-leaders (“World leaders [from the G20 nations] are set to
endorse plans by regulators to end the era of too-big-to-fail banks, forcing them
to raise as much as $1.2 trillion, and backed proposals to wrap up sweeping
reforms of rules for the global banking system.”).
14. Press Release, Fin. Stability Bd., FSB Publishes Further Guidance on
Resolution Planning and Fifth Report to the G20 on Progress in Resolution
(Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.fsb.org/2016/08/fsb-publishes-further-guidance-on
-resolution-planning-and-fifth-report-to-the-g20-on-progress-in-resolution.
15. FIN. STABILITY BD., RESILIENCE THROUGH RESOLVABILITY – MOVING
FROM POLICY DESIGN TO IMPLEMENTATION: 5TH REPORT TO THE G20 ON PROGRESS IN RESOLUTION 4 (2016), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/
Resilience-through-resolvability-–-moving-from-policy-design-to
-implementation.pdf.
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morally hazardous, and thus excessive, risk-taking. 16 This Article contends that excessive corporate risk-taking is not caused
by bailout-induced moral hazard (hereinafter, “moral hazard”). 17
Rather, such risk-taking is more likely caused by other factors, 18
including the governance requirement that corporate managers—including managers of systemically important firms—view
the consequences of their firm’s actions from the standpoint of
the firm and its investors, ignoring systemic externalities that
can harm the public. As a result, regulating excessive risk-taking by ending TBTF can be inefficient, 19 ineffective, 20 and sometimes even dangerous. 21 Excessive risk-taking can, and should,
be more directly and efficiently regulated by altering the governance of systemically important firms.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I shows there is no evidence that moral hazard is the cause of excessive corporate risktaking by systemically important firms. To the contrary, such
firms are often so large and their actions so subject to scrutiny
16. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. Although in theory a systemically important firm might not necessarily be TBTF, the financial literature
treats the two synonymously. See, e.g., MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R42150, SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT OR “ TOO BIG TO FAIL” FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2017) (treating systemically important firms as TBTF ). This Article follows this approach to the extent that it assumes for analytical purposes
that systemically important firms could be TBTF.
17. This Article refers to moral hazard in the bailout-induced sense, which
is commonly linked to the problem of TBTF. In its broadest sense, moral hazard
can refer to any “condition that insulates someone from the risk of or responsibility for an action.” BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 710 (Stephen Michael Sheppard,
ed., compact ed., 2011). In that sense, a firm’s externalization of systemic harm
also creates moral hazard.
18. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power
and Limits of Law, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 815 (discussing other factors that can
cause systemically important firms to engage in excessive risk-taking, including
limited liability and conflicts of interest between the firm’s secondary and senior
managers).
19. TBTF regulation that focuses on limiting the size of systemically important firms can, for example, reduce economies of scale and scope. See infra
notes 69–78 and accompanying text.
20. TBTF-motivated regulation that imposes higher capital requirements
may not, for example, discourage excessive risk-taking. See infra notes 90–96
and accompanying text. And TBTF-motivated regulation that attempts to convert debt to equity has never been truly tested, can raise its own moral hazard
concern, and may well make that debt too expensive. See infra notes 117–25 and
accompanying text.
21. The Dodd-Frank Act’s TBTF-motivated restriction of the Federal Reserve’s authority to act as a lender of last resort to systemically important firms
exacerbates the risk, for example, that a failing firm will trigger another financial crisis. See infra notes 128–32 and accompanying text.
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that they would have difficulty taking excessive risks in the expectation of a bailout; they are, in the words of this Article’s title,
“too big to fool” the public. Part II explains why other factors can
cause those firms to engage in excessive risk-taking. Part III analyzes why regulatory solutions to limit TBTF are misguided.
Part IV shows how excessive risk-taking can, and should, be
more directly regulated by internalizing the costs of systemic externalities and bailouts.
I. TBTF DOES NOT CAUSE MORALLY HAZARDOUS
BEHAVIOR
There is no evidence, much less proof, that TBTF causes
firms to engage in morally hazardous behavior. Most studies discussing such behavior merely assume it without actually offering evidence. 22 Other studies conflate correlation and causation,
assuming that if many systemically important firms engage in
risky behavior, their behavior was predicated on bailout expectations. 23 The fallacy of that logic is clear:

22. See, e.g., JACOPO CARMASSI ET AL., OVERCOMING TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL: A
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK TO LIMIT MORAL HAZARD AND FREE RIDING IN THE
FINANCIAL SECTOR 16 (2010) (stating that “a blanket protection may exacerbate
moral hazard and compromise market discipline”) (emphasis added); Lawrence
G. Baxter, Fundamental Forces Driving United States and International Financial Regulation Reform, 6 SUNGKYUNKWAN J. SCI. & TECH. L. 105, 113 (2012)
(“ The TBTF status [of certain] institutions . . . creates a class of institutions
that are, in effect, ‘protected’ by government. They are able to borrow at lower
cost because creditors do not believe they will be allowed to fail, and moral hazard is correspondingly increased as their managers become less sensitive to the
costs of potential failure.”); Frederic S. Mishkin et al., How Big a Problem Is Too
Big To Fail? A Review of Gary Stern and Ron Feldman’s “ Too Big To Fail: The
Hazards of Bank Bailouts,” 44 J. ECON. LIT. 988, 990 (2006) (“ The result of the
too-big-to-fail policy is that large banks are likely to take on greater risks,
thereby making bank failures more likely.”) (emphasis added).
23. See, e.g., Ning Gong & Kenneth D. Jones, Bailouts, Monitoring, and
Penalties: An Integrated Framework of Government Policies To Manage the TooBig-To-Fail Problem, 13 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 299, 300 (“In this paper, we
analyze the formulation of a government’s bailout policy. Our model is based on
three premises. First, a bank can choose either a safer or a riskier project (portfolio). Without any subsidy or bailout in the event of failure of the projects,
shareholders prefer safer projects. Second, with a government subsidy (effectively bailout) in the event of failure, shareholders prefer riskier projects to the
safer ones.”); Ann Graham, Bringing to Heel the Elephants in the Economy: The
Case for Ending “ Too Big To Fail,” 8 PIERCE L. REV. 117, 125 n.40 (2010) (stating that, because many systemically important banks returned to “risky” behavior a year after being bailed out, namely “betting big on bonds, commodities
and exotic financial products”—they were reliant on the promise of TBTF protection; Manja Völz & Michael Wedow, Market Discipline and Too-Big-To-Fail
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Bailed-out banks are, by definition, in some sort of distress and exhibit
high risk. But this might be simply due to bad luck rather than to bad
behavior. Even a prudently managed bank might be distressed because
of an exogenous shock. Using the bailout of such an unlucky bank to
explain its risk is no evidence for moral hazard. Moral hazard problems
arise only from the additional risk taking due to higher bailout expectations, which are usually not observable. . . . Econometrically, the
identification of moral hazard therefore requires variables that well explain the likelihood of a bank bailout, but are uncorrelated with the
risk taking of banks. 24

The economic studies purporting to “prove” that TBTF
causes firms to engage in morally hazardous behavior merely
show that systemically important firms can borrow at lowerthan-average cost. 25 Economists presume this funding advantage derives from investor belief that these firms will be
bailed out before they default.26 That presumption, however, is

in the CDS Market: Does Banks’ Size Reduce Market Discipline?, 18 J. EMPIRIFIN. 195, 196 (2011) (“In practice, the TBTF policy appears to have been
extended to varying degrees to banks outside the top eleven, which has led to
excessive risk taking by large banks.”).
24. Lammertjan Dam & Michael Koetter, Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Germany, 25 REV. FIN. STUDS. 2343, 2344 (2012); cf. Skylar
Brooks & Domenico Lombardi, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Backgrounder,
GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 9), http://new-rules.org/storage/documents/sovereign_debt_
restructuring_background_paper_draft2014.pdf (discussing the difficulty of empirically identifying morally hazardous behavior in a sovereign debt context).
25. See, e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., CALIBRATING
THE GSIB SURCHARGE 13 (2015) (stating that some of the largest systemically
important firms are believed to have a funding advantage). Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has estimated informally that systemically
important firms can borrow at a funding advantage of fifty basis points. See
Regulation and Resolving Institutions Considered “ Too Big To Fail”: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 34
(2009) (statement of Martin Neil Baily & Robert E. Litan, referencing Chairman
Greenspan’s estimate).
26. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 25, at 13
(stating that the funding advantage “derives from the belief of some creditors
that the government might act to prevent [a systemically important firm] from
defaulting on its debts,” and that this funding advantage “creates an incentive
for [those firms] to take on even more leverage and make themselves even more
systemic (in order to increase the value of the [funding advantage] subsidy”)).
Compare MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42150, SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT OR “ TOO BIG TO FAIL” FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 22 (2014) (describing
as the “worst-case scenario” the possibility that government protection of systemically important firms “would provide a competitive advantage that would
enable more risk taking than before”), with Thomas F. Huertas, Resolution Reform, 13 FIN. & ECON. REV. 86, 88 (2014) (“If the market expects the government
to be able and willing to bail out banks . . . then such banks can borrow at lower
CAL
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unjustified. There are many other reasons besides the expectation of a bailout why systemically important firms, which usually are large, 27 can borrow at lower-than-average cost, including
that large firms generally have: (1) economies of scale;28 (2) better access to debt markets; 29 (3) larger dividend pay-out ratios; 30
and (4) credit that is less vulnerable to market disruption. 31 Nor
do those studies attempt to examine whether systemically important firms can borrow at lower cost than nonsystemically important large firms. 32
cost than they would be able to do strictly on the basis of their stand-alone rating. This encourages risk-taking at the bank, creating what economists term
‘moral hazard.’”).
27. Cf. infra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing why systemically
important firms are usually large).
28. VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., THE END OF MARKET DISCIPLINE? INVESTOR
EXPECTATIONS OF IMPLICIT GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES 4 (2016).
29. ANTONIOS ANTONIOU ET AL., DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE CAPITAL
STRUCTURE: EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 4 (2002). Large firms generally have better access to debt markets for reasons other than a TBTF perception. Most studies of that access make no reference to TBTF. See, e.g., Jan Bartholdy & Cesário Mateus, Debt and Taxes for Private Firms, 20 INT’L REV. FIN.
ANALYSIS 177, 177 (2011) (observing that “relatively large” firms generally have
good access to debt markets because they are often “public on a stock exchange
[and] financially sophisticated”); Armen Hovakimian et al., Are Corporate Default Probabilities Consistent with the Static Trade-off Theory?, 25 REV. FIN.
STUD. 315, 317 (2012) (observing that “larger firms are less risky, have lower
proportional bankruptcy costs, and have better access to debt markets”).
30. Christian Schoder, Demand, q, Financial Constraints and Shareholder
Value Revisited: An Econometric Micro-analysis of US Fixed Investment, 7 INT’L
J. ECON. & BUS. RESEARCH 28, 40 (2014).
31. Karen Gordon Mills & Brayden McCarthy, The State of Small Business
Lending: Credit Access During the Recovery and How Technology May Change
the Game 6 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 15-004, 2014); cf. ORCUN
KAYA, CAPITAL MARKETS UNION: AN AMBITIOUS GOAL, BUT FEW QUICK WINS
13 (Jan Schildbach ed., 2015) (discussing why banks have taken a cautious
stance in lending to Euro-area small and medium size enterprises).
32. One of the most rigorous economic studies relied on by advocates of
bailout-induced moral hazard is Bryan Kelly et al., Too-Systemic-To-Fail: What
Option Markets Imply About Sector-Wide Government Guarantees, 106 AM.
ECON. REV. 1278 (2016). The authors provide “new evidence from option prices
that suggests the [U.S.] government absorbed aggregate tail risk during the
2007–2009 financial crisis by providing a sector-wide bailout guarantee to the
financial sector.” Id. at 1318. In the words of the authors, though, this evidence
only suggests that the government provided a bailout guarantee. Id. Furthermore, they make no claim that systemically important firms engaged in bailoutinduced moral hazard. Even more significantly, their evidence of a “sector-wide
bailout guarantee” does not apply to “individual banks.” Id. at 1279. To the contrary, they find that individual banks did not benefit from that guarantee. Id.
They explain that result as follows: “[A]ny individual bank may still fail amid a
collective guarantee . . . .” Id.
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The idea that TBTF causes systemically important firms to
engage in morally hazardous behavior is also antithetical to
managerial incentives. Managers take serious personal risks
when they cause their firms to engage in excessive risk-taking
with the expectation that the firm will be bailed out by the government. If, as in the case of Lehman Brothers, the government
fails to bail out the firm, those managers are almost certain to
lose their jobs. 33 Even if there is a bailout, it may well be conditioned on culpable managers resigning or otherwise giving recompense. 34 In either case, the ensuing reputational damage
could permanently end a manager’s financial career. 35
Moreover, systemically important firms are usually large, 36
and—by virtue of being systemically important—their actions
are subject to more media and political scrutiny than ordinary
firms.37 If they take excessive risks in the expectation of a
bailout, such firms will almost certainly be recognized and subjected to harsh criticism.38
So why is there such a widespread belief that systemically
important firms engage in morally hazardous behavior? One reason, perhaps, is that moral hazard is a common explanation for
any excessive risk-taking, 39 including excessive risk-taking by
33. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy
and Investment Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 278 (1991) (“In practice, when a
publicly held corporation files for bankruptcy, many top managers lose their
jobs at the same time.”).
34. See, e.g., JEFFREY FRIEDMAN & WLADIMIR KRAUS, ENGINEERING THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS: SYSTEMIC RISK AND THE FAILURE OF REGULATION 43 (2011)
(“[W]hen Continental Illinois failed, its managers were fired and its shareholders were wiped out, and when [Long Term Capital Management] was bailed out,
its principals were essentially wiped out, too. It would not be logical for any selfinterested bank executive to run a bank into the ground because of his or her
belief that it would then be bailed out if she would then be fired (and, if compensated with equities, wiped out.)”).
35. Id.
36. See INT’L MONETARY FUND ET AL., GUIDANCE TO ASSESS THE SYSTEMIC
IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS AND INSTRUMENTS: INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS (2009), https://www.bis.org/publ/othp07.pdf (discussing
size as one of the key factors for determining a firm’s systemic importance).
37. See, e.g., DELOITTE CTR. FOR REGULATORY STRATEGIES, SIFI DESIGNATION AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON NONBANK FINANCIAL COMPANIES 6
(2013), http://www.fsroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/SIFI
-designation-and-its-potential-impact-on-nonbank-financial-companies.pdf
(“SIFI designation indicates considerable additional scrutiny for a company.”).
38. That explains, as mentioned (see supra text accompanying notes 21–
22), this Article’s title—“too big to fool” the public.
39. See, e.g., Aviva Aron-Dine et al., Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: Do
Dynamic Incentives Matter?, 97 REV. ECON. & STAT. 725 (2015) (finding moral
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firms.40 Attributing excessive corporate risk-taking to moral
hazard also accords with the human inclination, inflamed by politicians and the media, to view harm as being caused by wrongdoers. 41 It also goes without saying that “too big to fail” is a great
sound-bite.
II. OTHER FACTORS CAUSE SYSTEMICALLY
IMPORTANT FIRMS TO ENGAGE IN EXCESSIVE RISKTAKING
If moral hazard does not cause systemically important firms
to take excessive risks, then why do they sometimes engage in
that risk-taking? There are several possible alternative explanations. To some extent, excessive risk-taking may result from a
misalignment between managerial and investor interests. 42 As
later discussed, however, even perfectly aligning those interests
would not sufficiently control that risk-taking.43 Another possible explanation is that limited liability motivates shareholders
of systemically important firms to take risks that could generate
outsized personal profits, even if that greatly increases systemic
risk.44 But that explanation is incomplete because it is mostly
hazard in health insurance markets); J. David Cummins & Sharon Tennyson,
Moral Hazard in Insurance Claiming: Evidence from Automobile Insurance, 12
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 29 (1996) (finding moral hazard in automobile insurance markets); Steven J. Harper, Bankruptcy and Bad Behavior: The Real
Moral Hazard: Law Schools Exploiting Market Dysfunction, 23 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 347, 365 (2015) (finding moral hazard by law schools “engag[ing]
in bad behavior that fills classrooms and maximizes revenues” as the cost of
tuition rises); Alan J. Kuperman, The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans, 52 INT’L STUD. Q. 49 (2008) (finding moral hazard by humanitarian actors in cases of genocide and ethnic cleansing); James
D. Shilling, Introduction to the Special Issue of International Real Estate Review, 18 INT’L REAL EST. REV. 149 (2015) (finding moral hazard in the housing
market).
40. See, e.g., David Rowell & Luke B. Connelly, A History of the Term
“Moral Hazard”, 79 J. RISK & INS. 1051 (2012).
41. This fundamental attribution bias not only leads observers to believe
events are caused by people rather than external factors, but also prevents observers from seeking deeper reasons behind an event once a sufficient reason—
like moral hazard by human actors—is found. See Dominik Duell & Dimitri
Landa, Attribution Bias in Strategic Environments, EPSA 2013 ANN. GEN.
CONF. PAPER 744, at 1, 7 (2013).
42. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
43. Cf. infra note 147 and accompanying text (arguing that systemic externalities result from a different misalignment of interests: between the firm, its
investors, and its managers on the one hand, and the public on the other hand).
44. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Governance Structure of Shadow Banking:
Rethinking Assumptions About Limited Liability, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1,
27–28 (2014).
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limited to relatively small systemically important firms, such as
hedge funds, that are managed directly by their primary investors. 45
Examining the corporate governance process reveals a more
fundamental reason for excessive risk-taking. As part of their
governance duties, a firm’s managers 46 engage the firm in risktaking in order to maximize profitability for the firm and its investors—principally its shareholders. 47 This shareholder primacy governance rule 48 creates a conflict between private and
public interests: risk-taking that is excessive from a public perspective, in that it has a negative expected value to the public, 49
might benefit the firm and its investors. 50 For nonsystemically
important firms, this conflict is either inconsequential 51 or addressed through laws that prohibit the firm from causing harm
or require the firm to internalize harmful costs.52
For systemically important firms, however, the conflict can
be highly consequential—especially if the risk-taking decision
causes the firm to fail, externalizing systemic harm onto other
market participants and the public, including ordinary citizens
affected by an economic collapse.53 Annex 1 to this Article illus-

45. Id. at 18.
46. See, e.g., Christine Hurt, The Duty To Manage Risk, 39 J. CORP. L. 253,
256–57 (2014). By “managers,” I refer to those with ultimate responsibility to
run the firm, such as a corporation’s directors.
47. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 9–10 (10th ed. 2011).
48. Cf. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 443–48 (2001) (discussing the ideological convergence worldwide of shareholder primacy as a governance rule).
49. The expected value of an action to a party is determined by comparing
the expected benefits and costs of the action to that party. Expected value thus
depends on the party on whom the impact is being measured.
50. Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public
Duty, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3 (2016) [hereinafter Misalignment].
51. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Collapsing Corporate Structures: Resolving the
Tension Between Form and Substance, 60 BUS. LAW. 109, 144 (2004) (observing
that corporate risk-taking routinely causes externalities).
52. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 425 (2002) (arguing that negative externalities created by corporate conduct
should be “constrained through general welfare legislation, tort litigation, and
other forms of regulation”).
53. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204–06 (2008)
[hereinafter Systemic Risk]. See also John Crawford, The Moral Hazard Paradox of Financial Safety Nets, CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 138 (“Financial
firms . . . are under-incentivized to insure at the optimal level, given the fact
that the potential systemic costs of their own failure would be borne primarily
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trates this impact, using the example of a systemically important firm whose risk-taking has a positive expected value to
its investors but a negative expected value to the public. Also,
this public-versus-private conflict has not yet been effectively addressed through laws for systemically important firms. Traditional regulatory approaches, such as imposing legal prohibitions or requirements to internalize harmful systemic costs, 54
have failed. 55 That failure has led to the type of frustration expressed as the consensus of an international conference on financial regulation sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston:
“policy makers have made little progress in figuring out how
they might actually” prevent another financial crisis. 56
There is another way to resolve the conflict. Regulators
should re-examine the corporate governance rule that actually
creates the conflict. 57 This approach is somewhat iconoclastic;
the law ordinarily avoids regulating corporate governance to address externalities because interfering with governance is
thought to “weaken[] the wealth-producing capacities of the
firm.” 58 Part IV will explain, however, how corporate governance
by others.”); cf. Alessio M. Pacces, Illiquidity and Financial Crisis, 74 U. PITT.
L. REV. 383, 417 (2013) (arguing that it “may be tempting to simply let banks
bear the consequences of their ” risk-taking, but a bank failure might “affect[ ]
all banks and the entire economy”). This market failure could be viewed as a
type of tragedy of the commons, insofar as market participants suffer from the
actions of other market participants depleting the shared resource of a common
financial market. Cf. Antonio Cabrales et al., Risk-Sharing and Contagion in
Networks, CESifo Working Paper No. 4715, 34 (2014) (“[T]ension arises from
the fact that firms have always an incentive to form connected components of
the size that minimizes the default probability of their members, thus ignoring
the negative externality this behavior imposes on other firms.”). It also could be
viewed as a more standard externality—and thus as a form of moral hazard,
though not bailout-induced moral hazard—insofar as nonmarket participants
(i.e., the citizens affected by an economic collapse) suffer from the actions of
market participants.
54. Cf. supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text (referencing the application of traditional regulatory approaches to nonsystemically important firms).
55. See Misalignment, supra note 50, at 17–21 (demonstrating that substantive legal prohibitions and requirements to internalize harm may be “insufficient . . . to control the excessive corporate risk-taking that causes systemic
externalities”).
56. Binyamin Appelbaum, Skepticism Prevails on Preventing Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 5, 2015, at B1.
57. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text (discussing shareholder
primacy).
58. Ian B. Lee, The Role of the Public Interest in Corporate Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 106, 124 (Claire A.
Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012). See also Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas
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law could be modified to resolve the conflict without unduly
weakening the wealth production of systemically important
firms.
In the financial context of this Article, focusing on corporate
governance has another advantage over traditional regulatory
approaches. Traditional approaches often depend on regulators
precisely understanding the particular design and structure of
financial firms, markets, and other related institutions at the
time the regulation is promulgated.59 Because these institutions
constantly change,60 traditional regulation becomes obsolete unless it is continuously updated to adapt to the changes. 61 Such
updating, however, can be costly and “is subject to political interference at each updating stage.” 62 As a result, traditional regulation usually lags financial innovation.63 Regulating corporate
governance can overcome that regulatory time lag; if the firm is
proposing to engage in a risky financial innovation, its managers
Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 380–81
(2015) (contending that the most responsible, legitimate, and effective way to
control externalities is to have the “legitimate instruments of the people’s will,
reflective of their desire, set the boundaries for corporate conduct”); cf. Milton
Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is To Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 122, 124 (arguing that managers lack the political legitimacy and expertise to consider social interests).
59. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Change: A Functional Approach, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1441, 1442 (2016) [hereinafter Regulating Financial
Change].
60. Id.
61. Cf. PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW LOMBARD STREET: HOW THE FED BECAME THE DEALER OF LAST RESORT 4–5 (2011) (arguing that because economics
and finance “largely ignore the sophisticated mechanism that operates to channel cash flows . . . to meet cash commitments,” they have not “been particularly
well suited for understanding the . . . [financial] crisis during which the crucial
monetary plumbing broke down”).
62. Regulating Financial Change, supra note 59, at 1443.
63. Id. See also Edward J. Kane, Policy Implications of Structural Changes
in Financial Markets, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 96, 97 (1983) (describing how regulatory responses lag behind innovations). In 2007, for example, the precrisis financial regulatory framework, which assumed the dominance of bank-intermediated funding, failed to adequately address a collapsing financial system in
which the majority of funding had become nonbank intermediated. Regulating
Financial Change, supra note 59, at 1443–44. Cf. Julia Black, Restructuring
Global and EU Financial Regulation: Character, Capacities, and Learning, in
FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION: A POST-CRISIS ANALYSIS 13 (Eddy
Wymeersch et al. eds., 2012) (“[T]he system simply did not operate in the way
that regulators, banks, and economists had thought it did. If you do not understand how the system works, it is very hard to build in mechanisms either for
managing risk or for ensuring the system’s resilience when those risks crystallize.”).
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must try to obtain the most current information about the innovation and its consequences.
III. TBTF-BASED REGULATION OF EXCESSIVE RISKTAKING IS MISGUIDED
If the assumption that moral hazard causes systemically important firms to engage in excessive risk-taking is incorrect, then
regulation starting from that assumption is unlikely to control
that risk-taking and could even be harmful. This Part demonstrates that danger by examining the principal TBTF-based approaches to regulating excessive risk-taking that have been enacted into law or are being contemplated.
One such approach, breaking up firms and limiting their
size, discussed in Section A, 64 seeks to reduce the number of systemically important firms in the first place. Another approach,
imposing higher capital requirements, discussed in Section B, 65
seeks to make systemically important firms more robust so they
are unlikely to experience financial problems. A third approach,
converting debt to equity, discussed in Section C,66 seeks to preengineer a change to a systemically important firm’s capital
structure that is triggered if the firm experiences financial problems—in effect, a pre-planned debt workout. A fourth approach,
discussed in Section D, 67 seeks to control the failure of a systemically important firm in order to reduce moral hazard and the
need for a bailout. The examination shows that these approaches
can be inefficient, ineffective, or sometimes even dangerous.68

64. See infra notes 69–81 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 82–109 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 115–25 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 128–46 and accompanying text.
68. On a more theoretical level, one might argue that any TBTF-based approach to regulating excessive risk-taking could backfire. Any such approach is
primarily microprudential: it is designed to protect individual financial firms.
Even though such an approach is also incidentally macroprudential (i.e., protective of the financial system) by making it less likely that individual systemically important firms will fail, Professor Rizwaan Jameel Mokal argues that
trying to make the financial system stable by making it less likely that individual systemically important firms will fail can actually increase financial instability by ignoring the tendency of individual systemically important firms to try
to externalize costs. Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, Liquidity, Systemic Risk, and the
Bankruptcy Treatment of Financial Contracts, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM.
L. 15, 20, 68 (2015). In contrast, this Article’s proposal,—to require managers
to account for systemic externalities in their governance decisions—confronts
that tendency and has a clearly macroprudential goal: to reduce systemic risk.
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A. BREAKING UP FIRMS AND LIMITING THEIR SIZE
A commonly discussed TBTF-based regulatory approach is
to break up systemically important firms and limit their size so
they are no longer systemically important. 69 But if, as this Article argues,70 moral hazard does not cause systemically important firms to engage in excessively risky behavior, then this
approach would not directly address risk-taking.
Furthermore, this approach could be harmful: limiting firm
size can undermine the economies of scale and scope that firms
need to compete successfully in an increasingly globalized and
interconnected world.71
69. See, e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve, Speech at the Exchequer Club: Confronting Too Big To Fail (Oct. 1,
2009), 2009 WL 3372545 at *6 (“Another approach would be to attack the bigness problem head-on by limiting the size or interconnectedness of financial institutions. Some observers have even suggested that existing large firms should
be split up into smaller, not-too-big-to-fail entities, in a manner a bit reminiscent of the break-up of AT&T in the early 1980s.”); Marc R. Reinganum, Setting
National Priorities: Financial Challenges Facing the Obama Administration, 65
FIN. ANALYST J. 32, 34 (2009) (“In short, new policies should strive to make sure
that no investment firm is too big to fail by either limiting the size of firms or
prohibiting activities within a firm that can lead to failure.”); cf. Kashkari, supra note 4, at 5 (outlining a number of possible “transformative” approaches to
ending TBTF, including “[b]reaking up large banks into smaller, less connected,
less important entities”). Kashkari also suggests “[t]urning large banks into
public utilities by forcing them to hold so much capital that they virtually can’t
fail . . .[and] taxing leverage throughout the financial system to reduce systemic
risks wherever they lie.” Id. Another option is to implement alternative resolution mechanisms that could address some of the perceived shortcomings of current resolution plans. Id. at 3. Cf. Joseph Lawler, Warren Introduces GlassSteagall Bill To Break up Big Banks, WASH. EXAMINER (July 7, 2015), http://
www.washingtonexaminer.com/warren-introduces-glass-steagall-bill-to-break
-up-big-banks/article/2567757 (discussing ongoing political efforts to reduce the
size of systemically important firms). This Article does not purport to examine
whether breaking up systemically important firms could create a too many to
fail problem if multiple broken-up firms face highly correlated risks. Cf. John
C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need
for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 801 (2011)
(discussing those correlated risks).
70. See supra Part I (arguing that TBTF does not cause firms to engage in
morally hazardous behavior) and Part II (arguing that excessive risk-taking results from externalized harm, not from reliance on a bailout).
71. Cf. Anna Kovner et al., Do Big Banks Have Lower Operating Costs?,
FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 22 (2014) (“Consistent with recent
research that identifies the presence of scale economies in banking, our results
suggest that imposing size limits on banking firms would be likely to involve
real economic costs. . . . [A] back-of-the-envelope calculation applied to our estimates implies that limiting [bank holding company] size to be no larger than
4 percent of GDP would increase total noninterest expense by $2 billion to
$4 billion per quarter.”).
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Large firms have many competitive advantages over smaller
firms.72 As already mentioned, they can borrow at lower costs
and have economies of scale. 73 The latter include (1) brand-based
economies of scale due to the ability of large firms to obtain
brand recognition at lower cost; 74 (2) cost-based economies of
scale due to lower average cost per unit of output; 75 (3) and revenue-based economies of scale because financial service providers are more likely to advance them large loans and to underwrite large securities offerings. 76 Similarly, large firms may
benefit by offering a broad range of products or services to a large
client base.77 Furthermore, in the increasingly global market of
finance, larger financial firms can benefit by projecting a greater
international presence and more easily offering cross-border financial products. 78 A TBTF-based regulatory approach that
breaks up systemically important firms and limits their size
would result in those firms losing out on these important advantages, and thus would be inefficient.
Limiting firm size can also raise practical issues. For example, it is unclear what metric should govern whether a firm is
large enough that it should be broken up, especially for firms
that are already relatively small but still pose a systemic risk. 79
Because it could limit profitability,80 any effort to break up firms
72. I am not advocating that firms be any larger, however, than needed to
achieve economies of scale and scope and other appropriate benefits. Size can
create its own problems, including potentially making a firm too big to properly
manage.
73. See supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text.
74. Jean Dermine, European Banking: Past, Present, and Future, in THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM, 31, 57–58 (Vítor
Gasper et al. eds., 2002).
75. Id.
76. Id.; cf. Joseph P. Hughes & Loretta J. Mester, Who Said Large Banks
Don’t Experience Scale Economies? Evidence from a Risk-Return-Driven Cost
Function, 22 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 559, 561 (2013) (arguing that large banks
have cost- and revenue-based economies of scale derived from their heightened
risk-return tradeoff ).
77. Dermine, supra note 74, at 29. Large firms even have defense-based
economies of scale, because their size provides protection against takeover attempts. Id.
78. Cf. Jean Dermine & Dirk Schoenmaker, In Banking, Is Small Beautiful?, 19 FIN. MKTS., INSTS. & INSTRUMENTS 1, 7 (2010) (arguing that smaller
banks are less competitive in international finance).
79. Gary H. Stern & Ron Feldman, Addressing TBTF by Shrinking Financial Institutions: An Initial Assessment, REGION (Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, Minn.), June 2009, at 10, https://www.minneapolisfed.org/
~/media/files/pubs/region/09-06/shrinking.pdf.
80. See supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text.
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is also likely to be unpopular among, and therefore opposed by,
shareholders. 81
B. IMPOSING HIGHER CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
Another TBTF-based approach to regulating excessive risktaking is to impose higher capital and other requirements on systemically important firms. 82 In the United States, for example,
this is done by designating such firms as systemically important
financial institutions, or SIFIs, which thereby subjects them to
capital requirements set by the Federal Reserve. 83 These capital
requirements are based on the framework known as the Basel
Accords, promulgated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements. 84
In response to the financial crisis, the Basel Committee issued the Basel III recommendations, which are designed to further strengthen bank capital requirements beyond those set in
the Basel I and Basel II recommendations. 85 The Federal Reserve’s minimum capital requirements are based on Basel III.86
The Federal Reserve is also subjecting eight U.S.-based globally

81. Stern & Feldman, supra note 79, at 10.
82. Cf. Anat R. Admati, The Missed Opportunity and Challenge of Capital
Regulation, NAT’L. INST. ECON. REV. No. 235, Feb. 2016, at R4 (“Capital regulation is critical to address distortions and externalities from . . . the failure of
markets to counter incentives for recklessness.”); Sanjai Bhagat et al., Size, Leverage, and Risk-Taking of Financial Institutions, 59 J. BANKING & FIN. 520, 521
(2015) (“[Our findings] suggest that instead of just limiting firm size, it may be
more effective for regulators to strengthen and enhance regulations on equity
capital requirements for all financial institutions.”).
83. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
12 U.S.C. § 5325(a)(1) (2012) (authorizing the Financial Stability Oversight
Council to make recommendations to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on the “prudential standards and reporting and disclosure requirements” of SIFIs).
84. See, e.g., Thomas L. Hogan & Neil R. Meredith, Risk and Risk-Based
Capital of U.S. Bank Holding Companies, 49 J. REG. ECON. 86, 90 (2016),
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11149-015-9289-8 (describing the Basel framework and measures specific to the United States).
85. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 2, 56
(2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf.
86. Hogan & Meredith, supra note 84, at 87.
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systemically important banks (G-SIBs)87 to risk-based capital
surcharges over and above the Basel III recommended level.88
The ability of capital requirements to prevent risk-taking is
unclear, however.89 Part of the articulated academic rationale
for imposing capital requirements is that “[w]ith more capital, a
large bank has more to lose if it goes under and, thus, has less
incentives to take on risk.” 90 But the more widely accepted government regulatory rationale for imposing capital requirements
is to protect financial institutions against unexpected losses.91
The Federal Reserve itself says the regulatory rationale is to enable banks and other financial firms to “hold adequate capital
under adverse conditions to maintain ready access to funding,
continue to serve as credit intermediaries, and continue operations.” 92 The then-Chairman of the Financial Stability Board,
87. G-SIBs are banks whose collapse would threaten the entire international financial system. Meraj Allahrakha et al., Systemic Importance Indicators for 33 U.S. Bank Holding Companies: An Overview of Recent Data, OFF.
FIN. RESEARCH BRIEF SERIES (Office of Financial Research), Feb. 12, 2015, at
1.
88. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., (Dec. 9, 2014),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20141209a.htm. The
surcharge, intended to become effective January 1, 2019, is to be calibrated
based on each firm’s systemic risk profile. Id.
89. Cf. Alessio M. Pacces, The Future in Law & Finance 24 (Erasmus Univ.
Rotterdam, Law Working Paper No. 217/2013, 2013) (observing that “higher
capital requirements cannot stop banks from taking excessive risk”).
90. Mishkin et al., supra note 22, at 996 (“Higher capital requirements thus
. . . make the too-big-to-fail problem less severe.”); cf. Anjan V. Thakor, Bank
Capital and Financial Stability: An Economic Tradeoff or Faustian Bargaining?, 6 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 185, 200 (2014) (observing that theories that emphasize the positive role of bank capital “rel[y] on the idea that the shareholders
of better-capitalized banks have more to lose from bank failure and are therefore more likely to engage in costly borrower monitoring”); Hendrik Hakenes &
Isabel Schnabel, Bank Size and Risk-Taking Under Basel II, 35 J. BANKING &
FIN. 1436, 1437 n.5 (2011) (“Most of the existing [scholarly] literature focuses
on moral hazard as the main motivation for capital requirements.”).
91. Kern Alexander & Steven L. Schwarcz, The Macroprudential Quandary: Unsystematic Efforts To Reform Financial Regulation, in RECONCEPTUALISING GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS REGULATION 127, 136 (Ross Buckley et al. eds.,
2016); cf. Admati, supra note 82, at R4 (“Well-designed capital regulation ensures that an appropriate part of funding is obtained and maintained from owners and shareholders . . . [who] automatically absorb losses . . . .”); Hakenes &
Schnabel, supra note 90, at 1437 n.5 (acknowledging that “[a]nother prominent
explanation [for imposing capital requirements is to] buffer against losses”).
92. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Revised Temporary Addendum to SR Letter 09-4: Dividend Increases and Other Capital Distributions for
the 19 Supervisory Assessment Program Bank Holding Companies 1 (Nov. 17,
2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2009/SR0904_
Addendum.pdf.
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Mario Draghi, likewise articulated that regulatory rationale in
2011.93 He also has explicitly questioned the ability of capital
requirements to prevent risk-taking.94
It therefore appears unsettled whether higher capital requirements will discourage excessive risk-taking. 95 Even minimal discouragement might be beneficial, though, if there is no
cost. Although certain economists argue that higher capital requirements have no associated public costs,96 others argue to the
contrary. Some fear that unintentionally excessive capital requirements can lead to social costs. 97 Others believe that capital
requirements might reduce bank lending, thereby causing a
credit shortfall that would harm the public. 98 Still others criticize capital requirements for cutting into global economic output
93. See Rainer Masera, Taking the Moral Hazard out of Banking: The Next
Fundamental Step in Financial Reform, 64 PSL Q. REV. 105, 109 (2011) (“[The
Chairman] . . . indicated that the new Basel III rules, aimed at strengthening
banks’ capital buffers, were a positive step to help prevent future crises, by reducing the probability of the failure of large banks.”).
94. Id. (stating that the Basel III capital requirements do “not address the
moral hazard problem”).
95. But cf. text accompanying note 193, infra (arguing that whether or not
higher capital requirements would discourage excessive risk-taking, they
should be considered to make a systemically important firm’s insolvency less
likely).
96. ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES:
WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 98 (2013); cf. Alberto
Locarno, The Macroeconomic Impact of Basel III on the Italian Economy, QUESTIONI DI ECONOMIA E FINANZA No. 88, (Bank of Italy), Feb. 2011, at 21 (arguing
in the context of the Italian economy that although the fall of output caused by
new capital requirements will impose temporary costs, “the gains [will] undoubtedly outweigh the costs to be paid to achieve a sounder banking system”).
97. See, e.g., Jean Dermine, Bank Regulations After the Global Financial
Crisis: Good Intentions and Unintended Evil, 19 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 658, 662
(2013) (“Or, if capital is excessive, it might lead to inefficiently higher interest
rates on bank loans . . . in a dynamic perspective, private costs may induce social costs as banks reduce their supply of loans or securitize assets.”).
98. See, e.g., Jacob Bikker & Haixa Hu, Cyclical Patterns in Profits, Provisioning and Lending of Banks and Procyclicality of the New Basel Capital Requirements, 55 BANCA NAZIONALE DEL LAVORO QUART. REV. 143, 144 (2002);
Reint Gropp et al., Bank Response to Higher Capital Requirements: Evidence
from a Quasi-Natural Experiment, (Sustainable Architecture for Fin. in Eur.,
Working Paper No. 156, 2016 https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/
148361/1/874406994.pdf (finding that higher bank capital requirements cause
banks to increase their capital ratios not by raising their levels of equity but by
reducing their credit supply, resulting in lower firm, investment, and sales
growth); cf. David Bholat, Money, Bank Debt, and Business Cycles: Between Economic Development and Financial Crises, in AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN A TIME OF CRISIS 28 (N. Orkun Akseli ed., 2013) (discussing theory that a contraction in bank lending results in declining economic
output, unemployment, and a recession or even depression).
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and reducing jobs.99 One financial economist recently claimed
that higher capital requirements can create “uncertainty [that]
severely undermines rather than reinforces market discipline”
because “the Basel [III] system of risk weights” is “excessively
complex and highly difficult to understand [and also] susceptib[le] to gaming.” 100 That uncertainty, he further contends, “will
lead to a near certain loss of confidence in the banking system”
in the event of a crisis. 101
Furthermore, the misapplication of capital requirements
could have a substantial cost. Capital requirements are generally imposed on a countercyclical basis.102 This recognizes that
finance, and especially banking, is by nature procyclical. 103 Lowering capital requirements can stimulate economic growth,
whereas increasing capital requirements can help to discourage
the buildup of imbalances during economic booms and bubbles. 104 There has been debate, however, about whether countercyclical regulation is actually feasible given that it is virtually

99. See Eduardo Porter, Recession’s True Cost Is Still Being Tallied, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/22/business/economy/
the-cost-of-the-financial-crisis-is-still-being-tallied.html (discussing these criticisms of capital requirements).
100. Emilios Avgouleas, Bank Leverage Ratios and Financial Stability: A
Micro- and Macroprudential Perspective, 16–17 (Levy Econ. Inst. Working Paper No. 849, 2015).
101. Id. at 17.
102. See Kristin N. Johnson, Macroprudential Regulation: A Sustainable Approach To Regulating Financial Markets, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 904, 916
(2013) (discussing flexible capital requirements as a macroprudential tool);
Richard Berner, Dir. of Office of Fin. Research, Remarks at the Joint Conference
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and Office of Financial Research, Financial Stability Analysis: Using the Tools, Finding the Data (May 30, 2013)
(identifying countercyclical capital requirements as a tool to reduce or neutralize “threats to financial stability”).
103. See Haocong Ren, Countercyclical Financial Regulation 3 (World Bank,
Working Paper No. 5823, 2011), http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/
10.1596/1813-9450-5823 (observing that during economic booms and bubbles,
credit expansion outpaces economic growth, and that during economic downturns, lending contracts further worsen economic prospects).
104. See Brett H. McDonnell, Designing Countercyclical Capital Buffers, 18
N.C. BANKING INST. 123, 123 (2013) (noting that the same factors that cause
cycles in the financial markets cause financial regulations to reinforce the cycles); see also id. at 124–30 (discussing how capital requirements are procyclical
when they force banks to cut back on lending due to faltering capital positions
because of decreasing credit quality and increasing losses, further deteriorating
economic performance and resulting in even more credit losses).
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impossible to know ex ante whether a financial cycle is rational
or merely a bubble.105
Yet, accuracy is critical; the mistiming or misapplication of
countercyclical regulation can be devastating, as illustrated by
the savings and loan (S&L) crisis of the 1980s in the United
States. S&L institutions faced a period in which rising interest
rates made lending less attractive to borrowers. 106 To avoid having to commit government funds to bail out financially stressed
institutions, regulators relieved the stress by engaging in a type
of countercyclicality: they eased the capital ratios in order to
“help troubled banks muddle through [that] difficult period[.]” 107
However, the result of that forbearance, in conjunction with
other regulatory-relief steps, was the rapid expansion of the size
of the S&L industry—from $686 billion in 1982 to $1.1 trillion in
1985.108 When the S&L industry eventually collapsed, its increased size led to the largest federal bailout in history up to that
time. 109
During the writing of this Article, the Minneapolis Fed issued a comment draft of its Plan [T]o End Too Big [T]o Fail. 110
The Plan focuses on dramatically increasing capital for all large
systemically important firms, and then forcing firms that are
still TBTF to “restructure themselves” or issue so much capital

105. See, e.g., Patricia A. McCoy, Countercyclical Regulation and Its Challenges 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1181, 1220 (2015) (observing that a primary prerequisite
to feasible countercyclical regulation is extensive data and information);
MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL
REGULATION 11, 18 (2009) (criticizing countercyclical capital buffers as being
difficult to implement, easy to circumvent, and subject to regulatory arbitrage).
Countercyclical regulation’s effectiveness could be further undermined by regulatory arbitrage if the measures are not analogously applied to relevant
shadow-banking activities. Ren, supra note 103, at 8.
106. Douglas J. Elliott et al., The History of Cyclical Macroprudential Policy
in the United States, in FINANCE AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION SERIES NO. 201329, 34 (Fed. Reserve Bd., 2013), https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2013/
201329/201329pap.pdf.
107. Id. (observing that this countercyclicality was imprecisely implemented).
108. Id. at 35.
109. See Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to Financial Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in
Crisis Response, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 39, 51–52 (2009).
110. FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, THE MINNEAPOLIS PLAN TO END
TOO BIG TO FAIL (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/~/media/files/
publications/studies/endingtbtf/the-minneapolis-plan-to-end-too-big-to-fail
-2016.pdf.

2017]

TOO BIG TO FOOL

781

that they “virtually cannot fail.” 111 Annex 2 to this Article sets
forth the author’s comments on that draft plan.
C. CONVERTING DEBT TO EQUITY
This approach—which includes the total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) proposal 112—seeks to pre-engineer a change to a
systemically important firm’s capital structure that is triggered
if the firm experiences financial problems. Thus the Minneapolis
Fed has considered TBTF-based regulation that would convert
certain debt claims into equity interests if and when a systemically important firm reaches a specified level of financial deterioration. 113 The debt-to-equity conversion of the securities evidencing these debt claims (called contingent convertible
securities, or “CoCos”) would not bring new cash into the firm. 114
Instead, it would reduce the firm’s indebtedness, thereby making the firm financially viable again. 115 The possibility that their

111. Press Release, Neel Kashkari, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Neel Kashkari Presents the Minneapolis Plan to End Too Big to Fail
(Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/~/media/files/publications/
studies/endingtbtf/the-minneapolis-plan/remarks-to-econ-club-of-ny.pdf.
112. Erica Jeffrey, TLAC: What You Should Know, EUROMONEY (Aug. 10,
2016), https://www.euromoney.com/article/b12kl97jn3mk69/tlac-what-you
-should-know (discussing how TLAC contemplates that systemically important
firms issue minimum levels of debt and similar securities “that can be written
down or converted into equity in case of resolution[.]”);see also Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, Long-Term Debt, and Clean Holding Company Requirements
for Systemically Important U.S. Bank Holding Companies and Intermediate
Holding Companies of Systemically Important Foreign Banking Organizations,
80 Fed. Reg. 74926 (proposed Nov. 30, 2015); Press Release, Fed. Reserve. Bd.,
Federal Reserve Board Proposes New Rule To Strengthen the Ability of Largest
Domestic and Foreign Banks Operating in the United States To Be Resolved
Without Extraordinary Government Support or Taxpayer Assistance (Oct. 30,
2015), http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20151030a
.htm.
113. See Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, The Fourth Symposium on Ending Too Big To Fail, September 26, https://www.minneapolisfed.org/
publications/special-studies/endingtbtf/symposiums/ending-too-big-to-fail
-symposium-iv (last visited Nov. 6, 2017); see also Tom Beardsworth & John
Glover, Contingent Convertibles: High-Yield Hand Grenades, BLOOMBERG:
QUICKTAKE (July 29, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/contingent
-convertible-bonds.
114. Edward Simpson Prescott, Contingent Capital: The Trigger Problem, 98
ECON. Q. 33, 34 n.3 (2012).
115. Jianping Zhu et al., From Bail-out to Bail-in: Mandatory Debt Restructuring of Systemic Financial Institutions, IMF STAFF DISCUSSION NOTE,
SDN/12/03, 14 (Apr. 24, 2012), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2012/
sdn1203.pdf.
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debt could be converted into equity should also motivate creditors to take on more of a “monitoring” role, 116 which could reduce
the firm’s risk-taking.
CoCos have been issued in Europe, where the initial tests of
their conversion have had mixed success. In early June 2017, the
junior-bond CoCos of Spain’s Banco Popular converted as
planned to prevent the bank’s failure. 117 Later that month, in
contrast, the senior-bond CoCos of Italy’s Veneto Banca and
Banca Popolare di Vicenza were not converted, resulting in a
taxpayer bailout of those banks. 118 Although there are ways to
try to distinguish these cases, 119 some argue they reflect the inevitable failure of CoCos as a viable resolution option. 120 Thus,
the effectiveness of CoCos in reducing excessive risk-taking remains uncertain. There are also questions remaining regarding
the actual implementation of such a CoCo conversion in the
United States, including what would trigger the debt to convert 121 and how to ensure that creditors holding convertible debt
are compensated without making the debt too costly. 122
116. Emilios Avgouleas & Charles Goodhart, Critical Reflections on Bank
Bail-Ins, 1 J. FIN. REG. 3, 4–5 (2015).
117. Senior Moment: Europe’s Framework for Dealing with Troubled Banks
Is Working, But Has One Big Drawback, ECONOMIST, July 1, 2017, at 14.
118. Id.
119. For example, the new European agency in charge of bank resolution,
the Single Resolution Board (SRB), apparently determined that the Italian
banks “did not pose a threat to financial stability, and handed them to the Italian authorities to deal with under national insolvency procedures[.]” Id. Although there is no evidence of this, the SRB might also have been more reluctant
to convert senior than junior bonds.
120. See, e.g., Neel Kashkari, New Bailouts Prove ‘Too Big To Fail’ Is Alive
and Well, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2017, at A17 (arguing that the Italian bank
bailouts prove that “‘bail-in debt’ doesn’t prevent bailouts”). Kashkari contends
that CoCos won’t work because governments “fear financial contagion” if they
“force losses on bondholders.” Id. Where systemic risk isn’t at issue, he maintains that CoCos won’t work because “governments may worry that bondholders
are politically important constituents.” Id. Professor Admati likewise argues
that it “is unrealistic to expect that regulators will trigger recovery and resolution processes that are complex, costly and untested so that losses can be imposed on debt-like TLAC securities, and that they would be politically able to
follow up with imposing losses on creditors’ mandatory conversion to equity.
This is particularly true if a potential crisis is looming, since pulling triggers
and inflicting haircuts might have unpredictable consequences throughout the
opaque financial system.” Admati, supra note 82, at R10.
121. See Emilios Avgouleas et al., Living Wills as a Catalyst for Action, DUISENBERG SCH. OF FIN. POL’Y PAPER NO. 4, 4 (2010).
122. Eric S. Halperin, CoCo Rising: Can the Emergence of Novel Hybrid Securities Protect from Future Liquidity Crises?, 8 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 15,
21–23 (2011) (explaining why issuing CoCos to investors may be more expensive
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CoCos can also raise their own moral hazard concern. Potentially, a “bank that issues contingent capital faces a moral
hazard incentive to increase its assets’ jump risks”—that is, the
risk that bank assets can suffer large, sudden losses. 123 In other
words, issuers of CoCos may be motivated to invest in risky assets because such issuers will be protected against a fall in asset
value by the CoCos’ debt-to-equity conversion. Attempts to reduce this moral hazard, such as including restrictive contractual
covenants, can be overly rigid and “impair[] the managers’ ability to pursue value-maximizing projects.” 124 The failure to reduce this moral hazard is likely to further increase the cost of
issuing CoCos. 125 President Kashkari himself appears to be
skeptical of this approach. 126 The Financial Stability Board,
however, has made this approach a significant part of its plans
to end TBTF. 127
D. CONTROLLING FAILURE TO REDUCE MORAL HAZARD AND THE
NEED FOR A BAILOUT
The final approach focuses on controlling the failure of a systemically important firm, in order to reduce moral hazard and
the need for a bailout. In the United States, for example, the
Dodd-Frank Act restricts the Federal Reserve’s authority to act
as a lender of last resort to provide bailouts to failing financial
institutions. 128 This restriction is primarily intended to reduce
than issuing ordinary debt); Paul Melaschenko & Noel Reynolds, A Template
for Recapitalising Too-Big-To-Fail Banks, BIS Q. REV. 25, 34–35 (June 2013).
123. George Pennacchi, A Structural Model of Contingent Bank Capital 28
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 10-04, 2010), https://www
.moodys.com/microsites/crc2010/papers/pennacchi_concap.pdf
124. Simone M. Sepe, Corporate Agency Problems and ‘Dequity’ Contracts,
36 J. CORP. L. 113, 145 (2010). Another concern over this moral hazard is that
it will increase the cost of CoCos.
125. Cf. Pennacchi, supra note 123, at 22 (arguing that investors in CoCos
that are subject to “downward jumps in value” will “demand higher new issue
yields to compensate for these potential losses”).
126. Kashkari, supra note 4.
127. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 15, at 8 (“Much has now been done
to achieve what is necessary to make too-big-to-fail banks resolvable. A particular milestone was the FSB’s publication in November 2015 of the finalised
standard for Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC). This policy taken together
with the other policy measures to enhance the resolvability of systemic banks
will, if implemented at firm level and underpinned by robust legal or regulatory
measures, contribute to greater resilience of the financial system.”) (internal
citation omitted).
128. The Dodd-Frank Act limits the authority of the Federal Reserve to
make emergency loans under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. DoddFrank amended that subsection to require the Federal Reserve to consult with
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the moral hazard of systemically important firms by removing
their expectation of a financial safety net should risky behavior
put such a firm at risk of failing. 129
Again, however, if moral hazard does not cause those firms
to engage in excessively risky behavior,130 then this restriction
cannot, by itself, prevent such behavior. Also, this restriction is
dangerous,131 making it much more likely that the government
will be unable to prevent systemically important firms from failing, with (predictably) systemically devastating consequences. 132
Planning ahead may also be ineffective to control failure.
The Dodd-Frank Act also requires certain systemically important firms to file so-called living wills, which are resolution
plans setting forth how they could liquidate with minimal systemic impact. 133 This is intended to reduce the need for a
and receive approval from the Secretary of the Treasury to ensure that any
emergency lending is designed to provide liquidity to the markets and not to aid
a financially failing firm. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1101(a)(6), 124 Stat. 2113, 2113–15 (2010).
129. See, e.g., Norbert J. Michel, Title XI Does Not End Federal Reserve
Bailouts, in THE CASE AGAINST DODD-FRANK: HOW THE “CONSUMER PROTECTION” LAW ENDANGERS AMERICANS 169, 170 (Norbert J. Michel ed., 2016) (“One
concern with central banks providing direct loans is a basic moral hazard problem. Namely, if central banks provide liberal credit to private banks (or other
private firms) on a regular basis, the knowledge of having easy access to these
loans would likely encourage private companies to take on additional risk.”).
130. See supra notes 22–31 and accompanying text.
131. Indeed, the restriction is counter to the European Union’s efforts to expand central bank authority to act as a lender of last resort to failing financial
institutions. Carlos Garcia-de-Andoain et al., Lending-of-Last-Resort Is as
Lending-of-Last-Resort Does: Central Bank Liquidity Provision and Interbank
Market Functioning in the Euro Area, 1 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 32 (2016).
132. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic
Risk: Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1376–
80 (2011); Coffee, supra note 9, at 825 (observing that the Dodd-Frank Act prevents federal government lender-of-last-resort assistance to nonbank financial
firms that are solvent but illiquid, thereby forcing “some firms into an arguably
unnecessary liquidation”); Michael Fleming & Asani Sarkar, The Failure Resolution of Lehman Brothers, 20 FED. RESERVE BD. N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 175,
178 (2014) (observing that the Dodd-Frank Act’s “circumscrib[ing] the ability of
the Fed[eral Reserve] to act as lender of last resort to the same extent that it
did during the financial crisis” will virtually assure that the future bankruptcy
of a systemically important firm will result in high creditor losses).
133. See, e.g., Jennifer Meyerowitz & Joseph N. Wharton, A Dodd-Frank
Living Wills Primer: What You Need To Know Now, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 34,
34 (Aug. 2012) (“As part of the goal to remove the risks to the financial system
posed by ‘too big to fail’ institutions, § 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act requires
‘systemically important financial institutions’ to create ‘living wills’ to facilitate
‘rapid and orderly resolution,[sic] in the event of material financial distress or
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bailout.134 The living-will requirement might not, however, eliminate that need.135 In my many years as a workout and bankruptcy lawyer, I rarely saw a firm’s failure that accurately reflected, much less closely resembled, expectations about the firm
when it was profitable. Furthermore, living wills do not prevent
the concurrent failure of multiple otherwise-systemically important firms from collectively having a systemic impact. 136 The
financial crisis demonstrated that a concurrence of failures is
likely when the causes of the failures are interconnected, such
as an industry-wide overreliance on credit ratings. 137
The so-called single-point-of-entry (SPOE) strategy represents another way to attempt to control the failure of a systemically important firm in order to reduce the need for a public
bailout.138 This strategy is artificially dependent on systemically
important firms having a parent-subsidiary organizational
structure in which the parent holds the stock of the operatingcompany subsidiary. 139 At the start, therefore, it faces unique
legal challenges for cross-border systemically important firms,
which may not have the parent-subsidiary structure needed for
the strategy’s execution.
failure.’” (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d) (2012))).
134. See Clay R. Costner, Comment, Living Wills: Can a Flexible Approach
to Rulemaking Address Key Concerns Surrounding Dodd-Frank’s Resolution
Plans?, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 133, 138–40 (2012) (summarizing arguments for
how living wills might help address TBTF ).
135. Although it is questionable, as discussed, whether the U.S. government
could satisfy such a need if it arises. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
136. Cf. Victoria McGrane, FDIC Chief: Big Failure Won’t Harm the System,
WALL ST. J., May 12, 2015, at C1 (observing that some in Congress “doubt regulators could handle the failure of multiple major firms at the same time”).
137. Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the
Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 379–83 (2008); id. at 404–
05. Cf. Janet L. Yellen, Vice-Chair of Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Speech at the Annual Meeting of the National Association for Business Economics, Denver, Col. (Oct. 11, 2010), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/yellen20101011a.pdf (attributing the financial crisis to concurrences of
interrelated failures).
138. See, e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Board of Governors of the U.S.
Fed. Reserve Board, Toward Building a More Effective Resolution Regime: Progress and Challenges, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Board and Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Conference (Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.federalreserve
.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20131018a.pdf (“ The aim of the single-point-ofentry approach is to stabilize the failed firm quickly, in order to mitigate the
negative impact on the U.S. financial system, and to do so without supporting
the firm’s equity holders and other capital liabilities holders or exposing U.S.
taxpayers to losses.”).
139. John Crawford, “Single Point of Entry”: The Promise and Limits of the
Latest Cure for Bailouts, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 103, 107 (2014).
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Under the SPOE strategy, if the subsidiary begins to fail, a
government agency (in the United States, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation) becomes the receiver of the parent, 140
wiping out the parent-company’s shareholders (and potentially
writing down some of its debt).141 The receiver then may provide
temporary liquidity to the parent to keep the subsidiary operating (and thereby avoiding the instability that rocked the financial markets after Lehman Brothers collapsed 142), while it seeks
to sell its receivership interest to equity investors to bring in
more permanent capital. 143 Although proponents of the SPOE
strategy are optimistic it can work once implementation challenges are resolved, 144 others—including Kashkari 145—believe
the strategy is unlikely to be practical. 146
Part III has shown that the TBTF-based approaches to regulating excessive risk-taking are inadequate. As next explained,
such risk-taking should be more directly regulated.
140. Mechanically, the steps described above might take place through a
bridge company. The above-simplified description nonetheless would still accurately depict the economics of the SPOE strategy.
141. See, e.g., Jerome H. Powell, Governor, Fed. Reserve Board of Governors,
Ending “ Too Big To Fail”, Remarks at the Institute of International Bankers
2013 Washington Conference, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 14, 2013), https://www
.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20130304a.pdf.
142. Kwon-Yong Jin, How To Eat an Elephant: Corporate Group Structure
of Systemically Important Financial Institutions, Orderly Liquidation Authority, and Single Point of Entry Resolution, 124 YALE L.J. 1746, 1764 (2015).
143. Powell, supra note 141.
144. Jeremy C. Stein, Regulating Large Financial Institutions, in WHAT
HAVE WE LEARNED?: MACROECONOMIC POLICY AFTER THE CRISIS 135 (George
Akerlof et al. eds., 2014).
145. Kashkari, supra note 4 (observing that there is no way to test this strategy’s effectiveness until it is actually in use, and doubting it will be useful in a
stressed economic climate).
146. See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big and
Unable To Fail, (George Washington Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Paper
No. 2016-44, 2016) (describing single point of entry as “a resolution tool designed for a very stylized, even hypothetical sort of failure”); cf. Emilios Avgouleas & Charles Goodhart, A Critical Evaluation of Bail-ins as a Bank Recapitalisation Mechanism, Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper
10065, 18 (2014) (arguing that “[r]eputational contagion” may cause investor
flight once the holding company is liquidated, regardless of how many subsidiaries are still operating); Paul H. Kupiec & Peter J. Wallison, Can the “Single
Point of Entry” Strategy Be Used To Recapitalize a Failing Bank?, (Am. Enterprise Inst. Econ., Working Paper No. 2014-08, 2014) (discussing the possibility
that the FDIC may have to borrow from the U.S. Treasury to recapitalize subsidiaries, and expressing concern that Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act prohibits
bank-subsidiary recapitalization using such funds; also observing that if the use
of the funds are challenged, the losses are likely to fall on taxpayers).

2017]

TOO BIG TO FOOL

787

IV. EXCESSIVE RISK-TAKING SHOULD BE MORE
DIRECTLY REGULATED
If this Article is correct that systemically important firms
are more likely to engage in excessive risk-taking because much
of the systemic harm from their failure would be externalized
onto the public,147 regulation should require those firms to internalize systemic externalities. Section A shows how corporate
governance law could accomplish that, without unduly weakening corporate wealth-producing capacity, by mandating a public
governance duty to help realign private and public interests. 148
Section B thereafter addresses the problem that, notwithstanding a perfect realignment of private and public interests, a systemically important firm could still be subject to failure. An exogenous shock, for example, might cause the failure. 149 Avoiding
that failure could impose bailout costs on the public. Section B
argues for the creation of a privatized fund to minimize those
bailout costs.
This proposed realignment of private and public interests
under a public governance duty is fundamentally different from,
and should not be confused with, the regulatory responses to the
financial crisis that attempt to mitigate excessive risk-taking by
aligning managerial and investor interests.150 Those types of responses are necessary but insufficient: even if managerial and
147. See supra Part II. Recall that corporate governance law requires managers to view the consequences of their firm’s actions, and thus to view the expected value of corporate risk-taking, from the standpoint of the firm and its
investors. This ignores public externalities caused by the actions. Although that
generally makes sense, it does not make sense for risk-taking by systemically
important firms that can cause systemic externalities that damage the economy
and harm the public.
148. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision also advocates revising
corporate governance for banks, but so far its principles merely require managers to “look after the interests of the bank as a whole” and do not require them
to take into account the possibility of systemic externalities. See BASEL COMM.
ON BANKING SUPERVISION, GUIDELINES: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES
FOR BANKS (2015), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d328.pdf.
149. Cf. Dam & Koetter, supra note 24, at 2344 (“Even a prudently managed
bank might be distressed because of an exogenous shock.”).
150. For example, requiring a systemically important firm to tie management compensation to the firm’s long-term performance is intended to better
align managerial and investor interests by penalizing managers who engage
such firms in risky ventures that, notwithstanding short-term appeal, ultimately jeopardize investors. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915 (2010); cf. Steven L.
Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457 (2009) (arguing that aligning sec-
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investor interests to engage in risk-taking could be perfectly
aligned, that would not control the systemic externalities that
result from a misalignment of interests between the private sector—the firm and its managers and investors—and the public
sector.151
A. REGULATING GOVERNANCE
As explained in Part II, excessive corporate risk-taking is
essentially a corporate governance problem. Much of the harm
from a systemically important firm’s failure would be externalized onto the public, but corporate governance law does not require managers to consider those externalities. As a result, systemically important firms “lack sufficient incentives to take
precautions against their own failures.” 152
Requiring managers of systemically important firms to account for systemic externalities in their governance decisions
would help to correct this misalignment between private and
public interests. That, in turn, would help to reduce excessive
risk-taking. To this end, I have separately argued that managers
of systemically important firms should have a duty to society (a
“public governance duty”) not to engage their firms in excessive
risk-taking that leads to systemic externalities. 153 I also have
analyzed in detail how to create a public governance duty without unduly weakening corporate wealth-producing capacity. 154
The remaining discussion in this Section A draws from, and is
more fully informed by, that analysis. 155
ondary and senior managerial interests can help to mitigate excessive risk-taking).
151. For a detailed analysis of why attempts to mitigate excessive risk-taking by aligning managerial and investor interests are insufficient, see Misalignment, supra note 50, at 7–8.
152. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., CALIBRATING THE GSIB
SURCHARGE 1 (July 20, 2015).
153. See Misalignment, supra note 50. Although a public governance duty
could be judicially created, I have argued that it should be enacted legislatively
because it broadly impacts public policy. In the United States, for example, this
would mean that a public governance duty should be imposed either by state
legislatures (especially the Delaware legislature, because most domestic firms
are incorporated under Delaware law) or by the U.S. Congress. Id. at 29–31.
154. See id. at 28–50.
155. To add some real-world perspective, it should be recognized that there
is precedent for altering corporate governance in light of public concerns. It is
done all the time, for example, to address national security concerns. Cf. Andrew
Verstein, The Corporate Governance of National Security, 95 WASH. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (discussing the “hundreds of companies” at which the federal
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Two critical questions arise in designing a corporate governance plan to reduce excessive risk-taking: how should a systemically important firm’s managers assess and balance the public
costs and private benefits of a risk-taking activity; and how
should the business judgment rule apply to their decisionmaking?
1. Assessing and Balancing Costs and Benefits

How should managers of a systemically important firm, or
members of its risk committee, 156 assess and balance the public
costs and private benefits of a risk-taking activity? Compare two
approaches, one subjective and the other more objective and
ministerial. To minimize the burden on managers, these approaches would be needed only when deciding on a risky project
whose failure might, either itself or in combination with other
factors, cause the firm to fail.157 That limitation on using the approaches recognizes that systemic externalities would most
likely result from such a failure. 158
Under the subjective approach, managers would simply consider and balance the public costs and private benefits of engaging in the project the same way they would consider and balance
any other relevant costs and benefits when making a corporate
governance decision. 159 Although managers might favor this approach, it would have several drawbacks. Most significantly,
such a decision-making process should be more publicly transparent because the consequences of a systemic collapse can be

government installs designees “to run the business without shareholder oversight, putting [national] security before profits”).
156. For example, section 165(h) of the Dodd-Frank Act directs the Federal
Reserve Board to require each publicly traded nonbank financial company supervised by the Board and each publicly traded bank holding company with total consolidated assets of ten billion dollars or more to establish a risk committee, which will be responsible for overseeing the company’s risk-management
practices. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(h) (2012). However, the Board’s implementing regulations currently only require risk committees to focus on risks to the firm, not
to the public. 12 C.F.R. § 252.20–35 (2017); cf. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 148 (observing that the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision’s governance principles do not require bank managers to consider
systemic externalities).
157. In making these decisions, I have suggested that managers should be
able to choose on a case-by-case basis whether to follow the subjective or objective approach. Misalignment, supra note 50, at 32.
158. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
159. Misalignment, supra note 50, at 32.
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devastating to the public. Managers following a subjective approach may also be subject to peer pressure to favor investor
profitability over avoiding public harm.160
The objective approach would be much more transparent
about how the public costs and private benefits are assessed and
balanced. Managers considering engaging in the project would
measure the public costs by the expected value of the project’s
systemic costs and would measure the private benefits by the
expected value of the project to the firm’s shareholders.161 With
one exception—valuing the systemic costs if the firm fails—those
managers should have sufficient information, or at least much
more information than third parties, about these values. 162
Valuing the systemic costs if the firm fails should be a public
policy choice. It might be based, for example, on the estimated
cost of a government bailout to avoid a systemic failure. Such an
estimate could be made by the government as part of the process
of designating a firm as systemically important, and thereafter
periodically updated by the government. 163
Under the objective and more ministerial approach, managers could simply use the expected value calculations to balance
the public costs and private benefits of engaging in the project.
From a Kaldor-Hicks economic efficiency standpoint, 164 the project’s justification would turn on the higher expected value. But
strict economic efficiency may be insufficient as a public policy
matter because the magnitude and harmful consequences of a
systemic collapse, if it occurs, could be devastating. It therefore
may be appropriate to apply a precautionary principle, requiring
a margin of safety in the balancing.165 Even if this margin-ofsafety requirement reduces a firm’s wealth production from a
given project that is not undertaken, the net wealth production
160. Id.
161. Id. at 33.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 33–34.
164. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion, under which the aggregate benefits exceed
the aggregate costs (even if those who benefit are not required to compensate
those who are harmed), sets the operating standard of efficiency. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2, at 13–14 (4th ed. 1992);
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV.
961, 1015 (2001).
165. Misalignment, supra note 50, at 35–36; cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the
Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1014 (2003) (discussing a precautionary principle under which “[r]egulation should include a margin of
safety, limiting activities below the level at which adverse effects have not been
found or predicted”).
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to society, after subtracting systemic costs, should be increased.166
2. Applying the Business Judgment Rule

How should the business judgment rule apply to a public
governance duty? In the traditional corporate governance context, managers are protected by this rule, which presumes that
they should not be personally liable for harm caused by negligent
decisions made in good faith and without conflicts of interest—
and in some articulations of the business judgment rule, also
without gross negligence. 167 The rule attempts to balance the
goal of protecting investors against losses with the goals of encouraging the best managers to serve 168 and avoiding the exercise of inappropriate judicial second-guessing.169
Arguably, the business judgment rule should apply differently to a public governance duty because one of the rule’s basic
assumptions—that there be no conflict of interest—may be
breached. The interest of a manager who holds significant shares
or interests in shares, or whose compensation or retention is dependent on share price, is aligned with the firm’s shareholders,
not with that of the public. To that extent, the manager would
have a conflict of interest. 170 To address that conflict, conflicted
managers who are grossly negligent—that is, who fail to use
even slight care in assessing systemic harm to the public—could
be barred from using the rule as a defense. Even with that bar,
managers who follow a reasonable procedure 171 to balance public

166. Misalignment, supra note 50, at 37.
167. Hurt, supra note 46, at 258–59.
168. See, e.g., Ryan Scarborough & Richard Olderman, Why Does the FDIC
Sue Bank Officers? Exploring the Boundaries of the Business Judgment Rule in
the Wake of the Great Recession, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 376–77
(2015).
169. Robert T. Miller, Oversight Liability for Risk-Management Failures at
Financial Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 120–21 (2010); see also Hurt, supra note
46, at 259–60.
170. Misalignment, supra note 50, at 42.
171. The business judgment rule generally respects a duty of process or care,
which is the standard commonly used in the United States. See, e.g., Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (stating that due care in the corporate
decision-making context is process due care only, not substantive due care); In
re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–68 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(“[T]he business judgment rule is process oriented and informed by a deep respect for all good faith board decisions.”).
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costs and private benefits would be using (at least) slight care
and therefore should be protected.172
B. MINIMIZING BAILOUT COSTS
Section A has shown how regulating the governance of systemically important firms could control excessive risk-taking.
Nonetheless, such a firm could still fail because that control was
imperfect or for exogenous reasons. Avoiding that failure could
impose bailout costs on the public.173 This Section discusses how
to minimize those bailout costs.
Government central banks traditionally are tasked with
helping to bail out critical banks, to prevent them from defaulting. They appear to perform this task well, 174 subject only to concerns over whether such measures impose bailout costs on taxpayers and whether bailouts create moral hazard. 175 Both of
those concerns could be addressed by privatizing the bailout cost.
Privatization could be implemented, for example, by taxing
systemically important firms to create a bailout fund. 176 In the
United States, there are analogous precedents for requiring the
private sector to contribute funds to help internalize externalities.177 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation requires
172. Misalignment, supra note 50, at 42–43.
173. See supra notes 3 and 6. In the United States, however, the experience
of the financial crisis is that the net cost of bailing out systemically important
firms has been relatively minimal, with the government recouping much of its
investment. See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman, U.S. Declares Bank and Auto Bailouts
Over, and Profitable, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2014, at B1.
174. See Gary Gorton & Lixin Huang, Liquidity, Efficiency, and Bank
Bailouts, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 455, 473–74 (2004).
175. Cf. supra Part III.D (discussing those concerns).
176. See Systemic Risk, supra note 53, at 226 (proposing this approach to
privatize bailout costs of systemically important firms); cf. Jeffrey N. Gordon &
Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s Dangers and
the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151,
156 (2011) (calling for a systemic emergency insurance fund that is funded by
the financial industry); Wilmarth, supra note 6, at 1015–22 (arguing that systemically important firms should be required to pay risk-based insurance premiums which would be used to fund liquidation of failed firms and thus reduce
potential bailout costs).
177. The externalities in our case would, of course, be bailout costs. Ironically, an earlier version of the Dodd-Frank Act included a provision for a privatized bailout fund sourced by large banks and other systemically important financial institutions. See Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S.
3217, 111th Cong. § 210(n) (2010). This provision was dropped, however, after
certain politicians alleged it would institutionalize bailouts. See Greg Hitt &
Damian Paletta, Senate Ends Financial Bill Standoff, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29,
2010, at A2. The plan by eleven European Union countries to impose a Financial
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member banks to contribute to a Deposit Insurance Fund to ensure that depositors of failed banks are repaid. 178 Similarly, U.S.
law requires each owner of a nuclear reactor to contribute monies to a fund to compensate for possible reactor accidents.179
Taxing systemically important firms in this way, to create a
bailout fund, should reduce the public cost of providing bailouts.
By internalizing costs, it should also reduce moral hazard. Indeed, the likelihood that systemically important firms will have
to make additional contributions to the fund to replenish bailout
monies should motivate those firms to cross monitor each other
and thereby help control each other’s risky behavior. 180
Privatizing bailout costs raises at least two practical concerns. First, we have insufficient experience to precisely determine these costs and thus to assess the exact amount each systemically important firm should be taxed. If taxes are too low,
taxpayer funding may be needed to cover shortfalls. 181 If taxes
are too high, economic efficiency may decrease because financial
firms have less capital to invest. 182 Regulators should be able to
at least roughly estimate these costs, however, by attempting to
match the firm in question to the most “comparable company”

Transactions Tax (FTT) provides another possible precedent for a privatized
bailout fund. See European Commission Press Release IP/13/115, Financial
Transaction Tax Under Enhanced Cooperation: Commission Sets out the Details (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-115_en
.htm.
178. 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d) (2012).
179. OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, NUCLEAR INSURANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF (2014), https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc
-collections/fact-sheets/nuclear-insurance.html.
180. Regulating Financial Change, supra note 59, at 1490.
181. Cf. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How
Law Can Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 125–
26 (2013) (cautioning that some amount of taxpayer funding will likely be
needed to cover bailout fund shortfalls); Adam Geršl & Petr Jakubík, How Important Is the Adverse Feedback Loop for the Banking Sector?, 60 EKONOMICKÝ
ČASOPIS 32, 34 (2012) (arguing that too small of a bailout fund could prove to be
procyclical by letting banks have too much capital and not enough of an insurance cushion).
182. Cf. European Cmm’n, Bail-In Tool: A Comparative Analysis of the Institutions’ Approaches 4 (Oct. 18, 2013) (unpublished working paper) (on file
with Minnesota Law Review) (“[M]ost banks today appear to have enough capital and bail-in-able liabilities to withstand losses in non-extreme cases without
resorting to resolution funds or state support. . . . It is also important to . . .
avoid unintended consequences such as spurring moral hazard by creating [an]
excessively large resolution fund.”).
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that has received bailout money in the past,183 based on the
tracking of data for bailout recipients in connection with the financial crisis.184 Furthermore, the bailout fund is contemplated
merely as a fallback to the primary remedy of imposing a public
governance duty. If that remedy works, relatively few systemically important firms would need a bailout. This Article’s proposal for a bailout fund should therefore be much more practical
than previously advanced conceptions for bailout funds as a primary remedy. 185
Another practical concern 186 is the need for international cooperation, so as not to drive systemically important firms in
high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions. This type of concern, though, has been addressed extensively by the international community in implementing the various Basel Capital Accords 187 as well as so-called soft law initiatives. 188
The foregoing discussion assumes that central banks will
have authority to use monies in the bailout fund to provide the
183. I say roughly estimate because a comparable company’s approach is
never based on exactly comparable companies. ASWATH DAMODARAN, APPLIED
CORPORATE FINANCE 565 (4th ed. 2015). Comparability might be assessed based
on factors that relate to systemic riskiness, such as size, interconnectedness,
substitutability, and leverage. See, e.g., IMF et al., Guidance To Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial
Considerations, Report to the G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (Oct. 2009), https://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/100109.pdf. The actual mechanics of the sizing could potentially raise other questions, such as the
following: how should the aggregate need for funding be estimated? How should
funding be allocated among contributing firms, initially and over time?
184. See Bailout Recipients, PROPUBLICA, http://projects.propublica.org/
bailout/list/index (last updated Sept. 12, 2017) (providing a bailout list, which
tracks every dollar and every recipient of U.S. government bailout money).
185. See Gorden & Muller, supra note 176; cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic
Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 801–02 (2011) (“Given high
correlation, the failure of one institution implies that all institutions facing correlated risks will face a similar crisis. Insurance cannot solve such an industrywide problem because no industry-funded insurance fund could ever be sufficient to insure against much of the industry’s failure.”).
186. Privatizing bailout costs may also raise political concerns. Cf. supra
note 177 (observing that although an earlier version of the Dodd-Frank Act included a provision for a privatized bailout fund, the provision was dropped after
certain politicians alleged it would institutionalize bailouts); Wilmarth, supra
note 6, at 954 (discussing political opposition to taxpayer-funded bailouts).
187. See supra notes 84–88 and accompanying text.
188. Cf. Andrew P. Morriss & Lotta Moberg, Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding the OECD’s Campaign Against “Harmful Tax Competition”, 4 COLUM. J. TAX
L. 1, 21 (2012) (discussing soft law initiatives by international organizations
such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).
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necessary bailouts. The central bank’s authority to provide
bailouts should therefore be restored in jurisdictions, such as the
United States, 189 where it has been limited. Furthermore, the
central bank’s authority to provide bailouts should be expanded
in all jurisdictions, as needed, to cover not only banks but also
nonbank systemically important financial firms.
Finally, in sizing a bailout fund, regulators will need to consider whether the fund should be sufficient to bail out not only
illiquid but also insolvent systemically important firms. For an
insolvent firm, liquidity would provide only temporary relief
from default.190 Regulators might consider, for example, whether
it would be sensible to combine a privatized liquidity bailout
fund with a resolution mechanism, such as the conversion of debt
to equity discussed in Part III.C,191 in order to make the firm
solvent again. Even if a resolution mechanism is insufficient and
too costly as a primary tool to control excessive risk-taking, it
might be more effective as a supplemental remedy to help reduce
potential bailout costs. 192 Additionally, whether or not higher
capital requirements would discourage excessive risk-taking,
they would certainly make a systemically important firm’s insolvency less likely 193 and therefore should be considered for this
purpose.
CONCLUSION
Why do systemically important financial firms engage in excessive risk-taking? Most attribute it to moral hazard: the idea
that such a firm will take risks assuming it will profit from success and, being “too big to fail,” be bailed out to prevent its failure. This Article begins by showing that attributing excessive
risk-taking to moral hazard is unsupported by evidence and inconsistent with management incentives. That calls into question
189. See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text.
190. Liquidity would only temporarily enable an insolvent firm to pay its
debts; because its assets are less than its liabilities, an insolvent firm is likely
to ultimately default.
191. See supra notes 112–27 and accompanying text.
192. A resolution mechanism that takes into account a statistical spreading
of insolvency risk among multiple systemically important firms would be especially cost-effective as a supplemental remedy.
193. See, e.g., Admati, supra note 82, at R10; but cf. Òscar Jordà, Björn Richter, Moritz Schularick, & Alan M. Taylor, Bank Capital Redux: Solvency, Liquidity, and Crisis 36–37 (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Working Paper No. 201706, 2017) (concluding, based on empirical data, that higher bank capital ratios
are unlikely to prevent a financial crisis, though they may facilitate much
quicker recoveries from financial crisis recessions).
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the efficacy of regulation designed to reduce that risk-taking by
reducing moral hazard. 194
Traditional corporate governance law, this Article argues, is
more likely to cause systemically important firms to engage in
excessive risk-taking. Such law requires managers to consider
risk-taking from the standpoint of the firm and its investors.
Much of the harm from a systemically important firm’s failure,
however, would be externalized onto the public. As a result, risktaking that is excessive from a public perspective might actually
benefit the firm and its investors (and therefore comply with corporate governance law).195
The Article shows that requiring managers of systemically
important firms to account for systemic externalities in their
governance decisions would help to align private and public interests. That, in turn, should reduce excessive risk-taking. The
Article also analyzes how to align these interests and reduce that
risk-taking without unduly weakening corporate wealth-producing capacity.
Reducing excessive risk-taking would make systemically
important firms less likely to fail. 196 It could not, however, completely eliminate the chance of failure. Even firms that take prudent risks could fail due to exogenous shocks.197 That leaves the
problem, albeit attenuated, that systemically important firms
will occasionally need to be bailed out. To minimize taxpayer
cost, the Article finally proposes requiring systemically important firms to contribute to a privatized bailout fund.

194. More technically, as this Article explains, systemically important firms
do not engage in excessive risk-taking because of bailout-induced moral hazard;
such risk-taking is instead caused by a form of moral hazard that results from
externalizing systemic harm onto the public.
195. In this sense—viewing externalities as a market failure—corporate governance law can cause market failures when applied to systemically important
firms.
196. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (observing that a systemically
important firm’s failure would most likely result from excessive risk-taking).
Although this Article argues for a public governance “duty,” other more incremental, though less effective, steps are also possible to try to align private and
public interests. One would be to expand on the idea of certain “constituency”
statutes that permit, but do not require, managers to take into account potential
systemic harm—effectively, a public governance right. Another such step might
be to harness bondholders, who are more risk averse than shareholders, in the
governance of systemically important firms. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Corporate Governance for a Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky
World, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1335, 1349 (2017).
197. See supra text accompanying note 24.
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ANNEX 1
CALCULATING EXPECTED VALUE DISPARITY
As discussed, systemically important firms can engage in
risk-taking ventures that have a positive expected value to their
investors but a negative expected value to the public.198
Consider managers of a systemically important firm deciding whether to engage in a risky project that could be profitable.
The expected value of the project to the firm’s investors (usually
the shareholders), which I’ll call α, can be calculated as follows:
α (expected value of project to investors) =
[X% chance of project succeeding × $Y value to investors
from that success 199] − [(1 − X% chance of project failing)
× $W loss from that failure].
Compare that to the expected value of the project to the public,
which I’ll call β:
β (expected value of project to public) =
[X% chance of project succeeding × N value to public from
that success] – [(1−X% chance of project failing) × F %
chance of firm failing as a result of the project’s failure ×
$Z resulting systemic costs]. 200
Most of these values would be pure business judgments about
which the firm’s managers should have sufficient information, or
at least much more information than third parties. For example,
those managers should have much more information than third
parties about valuing X%, the chance of the project being successful; $Y, the value to investors from that success; $W, the loss
from the project’s failure; and F %, the chance of the firm failing
as a result of the project’s failure (that is, effectively as a result
of the $W loss). The exceptions, however, are the values for $Z,
the systemic costs if the firm fails, and the values for N, the value
to the public from the project’s success.
Government financial regulators are likely to know much
more about valuing $Z than the firm’s managers. That valuation
should therefore be a public policy choice. Although there are
several possible ways of valuing $Z, for illustrative purposes I
198. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
199. $Y, the value to investors from the project’s success, could be measured
by profit or whatever other metric the firm normally uses.
200. For illustrative purposes, this equation has been simplified in several
ways, including that it assumes the only way a risky project could cause systemic costs is if the project’s failure causes the firm’s failure. That approach may
miss other triggers of systemic risk, such as the negative effects of correlated
portfolios.
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will base its value on the estimated cost of a government bailout
to avoid a systemic failure. Such an estimate could be required
to be made by the government, for example, as part of the process
of designating a firm as a systemically important financial institution 201 and thereafter periodically updated by the government.
Valuing N should also be a public policy choice. Certainly
the success of an individual firm’s project has at least indirect
value to the public, such as increasing job creation and economic
growth. Quantifying that value is difficult, however, because it
is so diffuse. For illustrative purposes, I will assume it is relatively de minimis for any given project and thus can be treated
as zero.
Subject to the caution that the values chosen below rely on
no hard empirical data and are solely illustrative (a quantitative
analysis being no better than its assumptions), assume that the
government has estimated the firm’s bailout cost ($Z) as $500
million 202 and that the firm’s managers estimate the other values as follows:
X% (the chance of the project succeeding) = 80%.
$Y (the value to investors from that success) = $50 million.
$W (the loss from the project’s failure) = $20 million.
F % (the chance of the firm failing as a result of the project’s failure) = 10%.
Applying these values yields the following:
α (expected value of the project to the firm’s investors) =
[(80% chance of project succeeding) × $50 million value
to investors from that success] − [(20% chance of project
failing) × $20 million loss from that failure]
= $36 million.
β (expected value of project to public) =
[(80% chance of project succeeding) × $0 value to public
from that success] − [(20% chance of project failing) ×
10% chance of firm failing as a result of the project’s failure × $500 million resulting systemic costs]
= − $10 million.
201. Such an estimate should, ideally, take into account both domestic and
foreign bailout costs. If Country X is designating a global firm as systemically
important, the bailout cost would include not only the Country X bailout cost
but also the costs of any necessary foreign bailouts.
202. Much will depend on the government’s valuation of $Z, the systemic
costs if the firm fails. If $Z were estimated as $1.5 billion, rather than $500
million, the expected value of the project’s systemically harmful costs would
equal $30 million in the above illustration instead of the $10 million cost shown
in the current example.
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This project thus has a positive expected value to the firm’s investors but a negative expected value (that is, a cost) to the public.
ANNEX 2
COMMENTS ON THE MINNEAPOLIS PLAN TO END TOO BIG TO
FAIL
Set forth below are the author’s comments, delivered to the
Minneapolis Fed. on December 9, 2016, on its proposed Plan To
End Too Big To Fail. 203
The Minneapolis Plan’s focus on the too-big-to-fail (TBTF)
problem appears to conflate, or at least ignore, cause and effect.
The TBTF problem is widely viewed as comprising two evils: that
systemically important banks might engage in excessive risktaking because they would profit by a success and expect to be
bailed out by the government to avoid a failure; and that government will have little choice but to bail out failing systemically
important banks, lest their losses be imposed on other banks.
The Minneapolis Plan focuses only on the latter evil—the effect,
not the cause.
Indeed, the Plan specifically defines the “TBTF problem” as
having that narrow focus: merely being the possibility that “the
largest and most systemically important banks fail and impose
their losses onto other banks.” Plan p. 2. This ignores how systemically important banks contributed to the 2007–08 financial
crisis and could touch off future crises. A comprehensive plan to
solve the TBTF problem should also examine the fundamental
question of why systemically important banks might fail.
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission has begun that examination, identifying excessive risk-taking by systemically important banks as a primary cause of the financial crisis. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT:
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF
THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES
xviii–xix (2011). Others concur with that view. See, e.g., Jacob J.
Lew, Opinion, Let’s Leave Wall Street’s Risky Practices in the
Past, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/bacob-lew-lets-leave-wall-streets-riskypractices-in-the-past/2015/01/09/cf25b5f6-95d8-11e4-aabdd0b93ff613d5_story.html (repeatedly attributing the financial
203. See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text.
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crisis to “excessive risks taken by financial” firms); The Origins
of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7,
2013), http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article
(identifying excessive risk-taking as one of three causes of the
financial crisis, the other causes being irresponsible lending and
regulators being “asleep at the wheel”).
If excessive risk-taking causes systemically important
banks to fail (requiring them to be bailed out before they “impose
their losses onto other banks”), any plan to address the TBTF
problem should also address that risk-taking. Some have already
examined excessive risk-taking and its causes. See, e.g., “Too Big
to Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and Corporate Responsibility,”
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2847026 (arguing that excessive risk-taking may result less from moral hazard and more
from a legally embedded conflict between corporate governance
and the public interest that allows managers of systemically important firms to ignore systemic externalities). The Minneapolis
Plan does not, however, take the cause of failure into account.
Ignoring causation can undermine the Plan’s recommendations. Because the Plan implicitly assumes that systemically important banks fail, its recommendations center on requiring high
levels of common-equity capital to prevent such failures. Some
economists (such as Professors Admati and Hellwig, whom I
greatly respect) argue that high capital requirements have little
associated public costs, but others argue to the contrary. Without
attempting to resolve that debate, I merely observe that if high
capital requirements are costly, it would be worth examining
whether other more targeted remedies (such as trying to mitigate the corporate governance conflict) could be more efficient.
Here is a simple way to think about this last point. The
Dodd-Frank Act’s limiting the Fed’s bailout powers under § 13(3)
of the Federal Reserve Act has been analogized to shutting down
fire departments in order to make homeowners more careful
about starting fires. If requiring high levels of common-equity
capital to prevent a bank failure is in fact very costly, then the
Plan’s requirement that systemically important banks hold that
capital is like making houses completely fireproof instead of improving the effectiveness of fire departments. That may well prevent the houses from burning down, but it is likely to be extremely expensive.
Ignoring causation raises other problems in the Plan,
though less serious. For example, the Plan states that as a result
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of the TBTF problem—which, as indicated, it defines as the possibility that systemically important banks fail and impose their
losses onto other banks—”trillions of dollars in American wealth
was destroyed.” Plan p. 2. But that wealth destruction resulted
from the financial crisis itself. The net cost of bailing out systemically important banks may actually be relatively minimal because the government has been recouping much of that investment.

